Due to limited data availability, we currently lack comparative empirical evidence on second-generation Muslims' religiosity in Europe. Previous studies were often restricted to the foreign-born first generation; they used narrow measures of religious affiliation and worship; and/or they were single-country studies (Diehl and Koenig, 2009 , Phalet et al., 2008 , Van Tubergen, 2007 . Comparative studies of religiosity among Muslim minorities in Europe remain an exception (but see Connor, 2010) . Recent cross-national surveys from the TIESproject (The Integration of the European Second generation, see e.g. Crul and Schneider, 2010 ) allow comparative investigations of multiple dimensions of religiosity among the Turkish second generation. Due to their different national histories of church-state relations, the four countries in our study -Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden -are characterized by different opportunity structures for the practice of Islam by Muslim minorities (Bader, 2007, Fetzer and Soper, 2005) . Against this comparative background, we assess theoretical expectations of religious decline and vitality in the second generation.
In the following, we first present our theoretical framework and derive hypotheses about individual-level determinants of religious decline and religious vitality in the second generation. Next, we derive hypotheses about contextual differences in the relation between second-generation integration and religiosity from an institutionalist approach to the incorporation of Islam in European societies. Before putting our hypotheses to a test, we briefly describe the groups and contexts under study and the data and methods applied.
The hypothesis of religious decline: structural integration and secularization
The secularization paradigm posits the erosion of religion through modernization processes, as evident from the progressive separation of church and state and from declining religious attendance (Dobbelaere, 1981) . Religious decline has been firmly established among
European majority populations (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008) and secularization has become an ideology -in stark contrast with the US. As Casanova (2003, p.19) puts it: 'Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious'. Contrary to the US, in European societies religion is commonly portrayed as hindering immigrant integration (Foner and Alba, 2008) .
Consequently, the classic assimilation hypothesis, which predicts that immigrants' life chances and life styles will gradually converge with those of natives over time and generations (Gordon, 1978 (Gordon, [1964 ), when applied to the religious domain, amounts to a secularization hypothesis in European societies. Accordingly, our first hypothesis expects that second-generation Muslims will be less religious the more they are integrated into the mainstream (Hypothesis 1) in terms of social mixing and socio-economic inclusion relative to a non-immigrant reference population (Esser, 2001) . Specifically, we predict that higher education and labour market participation as well as intermarriage with a non-Turkish partner will go together with lower levels of religiosity. Similar predictions can also be derived from the sociology of religion. Here, the expected inverse relationship of religiosity with education and labour market attainment is explained through increased exposure to a secular worldview (Berger, 1967) or through decreased economic uncertainty (Norris and Inglehart, 2004) .
Research among Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands (Van Tubergen, 2007 , Phalet et al., 2008 and in Belgium (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000, Smits et al., 2010) largely confirms secularization in the sense of an inverse relationship between socio- (Maliepaard et al., 2010) . Similarly in Germany, Diehl and Koenig (2009) found remarkable stability instead of religious decline between migration generations. To our knowledge, there is no comparable evidence from large-scale surveys on religion and integration in Sweden.
The hypothesis of religious vitality: religious socialization and reactive religiosity
An alternative hypothesis expects religious vitality, defined as the continuity of a minority religion through the religious socialization of the next generation within the family and the co-ethnic community, in parallel with a notion of ethno-linguistic vitality in socio-linguistic studies of minority languages (Harwood et al., 1994) . Turkish immigrants come from a majority Muslim society where levels of religiosity are much higher than in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands or Sweden (Norris and Inglehart, 2004 Religious studies document the importance of a religious upbringing so that the children of more religious parents will themselves be more religious as adults (Kelley and De Graaf, 1997) . Accordingly, we predict that the Turkish second generation will be more religious when their parents visited the mosque more often during their youth and/or when they attended Koran lessons as children (Hypothesis 2).
A complementary hypothesis of religious reactivity expects increased religiosity in the second generation in response to societal exclusion and experiences of discrimination.
This hypothesis extends a notion of reactive ethnicity among most deprived secondgeneration groups in the US (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) to the religious domain. The reactive religiosity hypothesis mirrors the inverse relation between socio-economic attainment and religiosity that is also predicted by the secularization hypothesis. In addition, however, impact of institutional arrangements on patterns of integration and religiosity, over and above variation resulting from short-term changes in public opinion and policy. Moreover, we argue that our comparison of capital cities is well-suited to bring out such national differences.
The Turkish second generation in North-Western Europe
Turkish immigrants first arrived in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium as so-called 'guest workers' and later through family-based migration. (Lesthaeghe, 2000 , Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000 , Münz et al., 1997 . In the Swedish context labour migration has been less important as the country received relatively more refugees (Corman, 2008) . Therefore, the Turkish-Swedish population is comparatively small and includes substantial shares of Kurdish and Assyrian refugees. Assyrians, who are mainly Orthodox Christians (Sander, 1990) , are excluded from our analysis for reasons of comparability. Turks are the largest non-European minority group in the Netherlands; including naturalized Turks and the second generation, they numbered 0.38 million, which is 2.3 per cent of the total population in 2009 (Statline, 2010) . Similarly, in Germany, Turkish immigrants and their offspring are the largest 
Data and Method
The TIES-surveys generally low cooperation rates in inner cities, in young age groups, and in ethnic minority populations (Stoop et al., 2010) . These data constraints should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from our comparative analyses.
To ensure that our comparative results are not driven by differential selectivity of Turkish immigrants across the cities, a detailed comparison was undertaken of the characteristics of the parents of TIES-participants, i.e., the Turkish first generation. 1 The comparison revealed very few differences in parental characteristics between the four cities.
Most parents matched the typical profile of Turkish guest worker migration to North-Western
Europe. Because the parents of Turkish Muslims in Brussels and Stockholm had somewhat higher levels of education, we include parental education as a control variable. Furthermore, we conducted logistic regression analyses to examine differential selectivity of selfcategorized Muslims across cities (see Note 4).
Measures
Religious identification was measured by four items reflecting participants' attachment to a common Muslim identity, e.g., "Being a Muslim is an important part of my self" (see Table 1 for the other items). They rated their agreement on five-point Likert-scales ranging from one (totally disagree) to five (totally agree).
Four indicators of religious practices were used to form two composite indices, labelled dietary practices and worship. Dietary practices refer to fasting during the last
Ramadan and eating halal food; worship refers to saying daily prayers and attending religious services (i.e., visiting a mosque). 2 While interrelated, it is useful to distinguish between worship and dietary practices as they form distinct clusters in K-means cluster analyses across the same Turkish Muslim populations (Phalet et al., in preparation).
An additional political dimension of religiosity, labelled political religion, is assessed by four statements expressing support for the role of Islam in politics and its representation in the public sphere, e.g., "Islam should be represented in politics and society" (see Table 1 for the remaining items). Regarding employment status, we distinguish between working (employed or selfemployed), unemployed, full-time student, or otherwise inactive participants.
Furthermore, we looked at the ethnicity of the partner, with a non-Turkish partner as a proxy for intermarriage outside the ethnic community of co-religionists. We distinguish between participants who had no partner, those who had a partner of Turkish origin, or a nonTurkish partner. Partners were categorized as Turkish when they, or one of their parents, were born in Turkey, thus including the second generation.
Two indicators were used to assess religious childhood socialization. A dummy variable indicates whether participants have attended Koran lessons outside school hours as a child. In addition, participants reported the frequency of parents' mosque visits during their youth on a five-point scale ranging from one (never) to five (once a week or more).
To test the reactive religiosity hypothesis, we used two questions on perceived discrimination. Participants were asked to rate the frequency with which they had personally experienced unfair treatment or hostility due to their background (perceived personal discrimination); and how often they thought that Muslims as a group experienced unfair treatment or hostility (perceived group discrimination). Although personal and group level perceptions of discrimination are inter-related, moderate correlations (< .40) confirm that they are distinct phenomena, with group discrimination being reported more frequently than personal discrimination. After establishing the measurement equivalence of religious identification, worship, dietary practices, and political religion across cities, a second-order factor model was estimated specifying one common factor, religiosity, which explains inter-factor correlations between the four dimensions of religiosity. This model fitted the data reasonably well: χ 2 (271, 615) = 512.010, CFI = 0.880, RMSEA = 0.038. However, the loadings of the four religiosity dimensions on the second-order factor differ significantly between the four cities, as the model fit is significantly worse when loadings are set equal: ∆ χ 2 (9) = 39.667, p < .001.
In comparative analyses, the loadings on the second-order factor religiosity are estimated 
Structural integration and secularization
With regard to degrees of religiosity, including religious identification, worship, dietary practices, and political religion, the secularization hypothesis, which predicts religious decline with the structural integration of the second generation, is not supported in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm; yet educational attainment is associated with lower religiosity in Berlin. Logistic regression of self-categorization as a Muslim yields parallel results (see Note 4), which shows that our findings apply not only to the degree of religiosity of the second generation, but also to religious self-identification. In support of differential associations, constraining the effects of educational and labour market attainment on religiosity to zero yields a significantly worse model fit only in Berlin, but not in the other three cities: ∆ χ 2 (18) = 21.859, p > .05. Similarly, having a Turkish partner is associated with higher religiosity only in Berlin (although a non-Turkish partner has no additional effect on religiosity). In the accommodated, yet they are decoupled in the other cities.
Religious vitality and reactive religiosity
In line with religious vitality, religious socialization has a strong impact on second-generation religiosity in all cities: Turkish Muslims who attended Koran lessons as a child or whose parents visited a mosque regularly are more religious. 6 Finally, reactive religiosity is not supported, as associations with perceived discrimination disappear after taking into account religious socialization, structural integration, and controls. Accordingly, constraining the effects of personal and group-level discrimination to zero in all cities does not significantly affect model fit: ∆ χ 2 (8) = 9.323, p > .05. Again, these effects are paralleled in logistic regressions predicting Muslim self-categorization. Comparative analyses revealed distinct components of religiosity, including religious identification, worship, dietary practices and political religion. Across cities, the same components constituted different patterns of religiosity, however, with less differentiated religious involvement among the second generation in Berlin and Stockholm and more selective patterns of religiosity in Amsterdam and Brussels. In the latter cities, political religion in particular was distinctive of only a subgroup of highly involved Muslims, while it was more closely associated with religious identity and practices in Berlin and Stockholm.
Turning to theoretical expectations of religious decline versus vitality in the second generation, we find support for the religious vitality hypothesis across the four cities whereas support for the secularization hypothesis is restricted to Berlin. Only here, educational attainment was inversely related to religiosity; in all other cities, second-generation religiosity was decoupled from structural integration. Differential associations of religiosity with integration point to the hypothesized moderating role of institutional accommodation. As expected, integration and religiosity were inversely related in the German context, where the state does not accommodate Islam as a minority religion. In the other contexts, where there is In line with our religious vitality hypothesis, we find that religious childhood socialization within Turkish immigrant families and communities strongly predicts continued religiosity in young adulthood. Second-generation Muslims whose parents visited a mosque more regularly or who attended Koran lessons as children were more religious later on in terms of their religious identification, practices and political religion in all four cities. This finding implies that the regulatory impact of different institutional arrangements is mostly restricted to that part of the social life of the second generation which is situated outside the co-ethnic community. Finally, and after taking into account religious socialization, we found no evidence of reactive religiosity.
Our findings should be interpreted with caution in light of data constraints. Firstly, the cross-sectional nature of the data does not permit us to empirically establish the direction of causality. Thus, we cannot be sure whether in Berlin higher education decreases religiosity, or high levels of religiosity hinder educational attainment, or whether the negative association of religion and integration works both ways. The issue of causal direction was not the main focus of our study, however, and our conclusions stand regardless of whether the negative association between religiosity and integration in Berlin works in either or both ways. The strength of the study is the comparative design, which allows us to replicate associations between integration and religion across four European capital cities which represent different models of church-state relations. Our finding of differential associations, in particular the lack of support for an inverse relationship of integration and religion in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, strongly suggests that there is nothing inherent in Islamic faith which would stand in the way of the integration of second-generation Muslims in European societies. The orthogonality of religion and structural integration is not an artefact due to a lack of variation in the structural integration of the Turkish second generation outside Berlin, since the marginal distributions of the four samples in Table 1 show that participants were similarly or Moreover, our analyses take into account competing explanations of religiosity from the differential selection of the first generation across the four cities; from childhood religious socialization; and from experiences of discrimination against Muslims. Taking into consideration these precautions, it seems plausible that different patterns of religiosity and integration between Berlin and the other capitals can be attributed at least in part to the cumulative impact of (the absence of) institutional recognition and accommodation in the receiving societies.
Secondly, our findings may be affected by low response rates to the TIES-surveys. In combination with different sampling frames, selective non-response implies that we cannot assume that the TIES-data are representative of the Turkish second generation, nor that participants are similarly selected in the four cities. Yet we found few differences in the selectivity of the first generation of Turkish immigrants across the four samples. Furthermore, we could establish measurement equivalence of latent dimensions of religiosity across cities.
Finally, our comparative analyses are concerned with differential patterns and associations of religiosity rather than differences in absolute levels, which are most vulnerable to sampling and measurement bias (Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997, Stoop et al., 2010) . For these reasons, the present analysis is a first step towards more comprehensive comparative analyses of religion among the European second generation, which should cross-validate our main finding of the conditional decoupling of religiosity and integration with other data sources.
Finally, our comparison is restricted to capital cities. To the extent that the differential institutionalization of Islam affects the relation between integration and religiosity, these effects of national institutions should show up in our comparative analysis. In support of our approach, previous research on public claims-making related to immigrant integration, revealed more variation between countries than between cities within the same country (Koopmans, 2004) . Our findings should not be generalized to the national level, however, because, with only one city and one immigrant group per country, it is not possible to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 integration is not significantly associated with religiosity. We conclude that religiosity is compatible with structural integration in more welcoming receiving contexts which accommodate religious diversity -albeit to varying degrees. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 3 The levels of education distinguished correspond to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED; UNESCO 1997), with low education representing ISCED-2 and below, vocational referring to ISCED-3B, upper secondary to ISCED-3A and tertiary to ISCED-5 and higher.
4 Self-categorized Muslims are participants who indicated that they currently had a religion and that this religion was Islam. Religious affiliation was used as a routing question in computer-assisted personal interviews such that participants who indicated that they had no religion did not answer questions on religious identification and practice. The wording of the routing question deviated in
Berlin where participants were asked "Are you currently religious?" This wording may have resulted in a greater selectivity of participants who completed the religiosity measures in Berlin. We analysed selfcategorization as Muslims using all independent variables as predictors in logistic regression. These results (not shown, available upon request) replicate similar context-dependent associations of religious membership with structural integration, religious socialization and perceived discrimination.
5 Moreover, model fit statistics suggest that the distinction between the two religious practice scales fits better to the data, compared to a model where all four indicators load on one common practice scale.
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is used to compare these competing models, with smaller values indicating better fit (Kline, 2005, Hu and Bentler, 1999) . AIC is 186.316 for a model with only one religious practice scale, while a model with two correlated practice scales has an AIC of 155.780, ceteris paribus. 6 The effects of Koran lessons and parental religiosity are not significant in Stockholm, yet constraining them to zero results in significantly worse model fit (∆ χ 2 (2) = 8.144, p = 0.017).
7 Table 2 also shows the loadings of the religiosity dimensions on the second-order factor after including all explanatory and control variables. Despite some changes in magnitude, the loadings still differ significantly between the four cities; constraining them to be equal results in significantly worse model fit: ∆ χ 2 (9) = 38.733, p < .001. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
